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  Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of dollarization in Ecuador and El Salvador. The variables studied are 
inflation, interest rate and GDP growth. We compare mean values and volatility before and after the 
implementation of the US dollar to analyze significant changes. Interest rates and inflation fell and 
stabilized in both countries after dollarization. The results regarding GDP growth are ambiguous 
which is explained by country specific factors. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of dollarization on 
trade by using a gravity regression model. Earlier empirical studies have shown equivocal results 
regarding the trade enhancing effect. Our findings provide no support of an increase in trade due to 
dollarization.   
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1 Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction 
In terms of exchange rates policies the last decades have been eventful. Transformations like 
the fall of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Euro have forced many countries to 
rethink their choice of exchange rate policy. In addition, the years around the turn of the 
millennium were characterized by currency crises: Southeast Asia starting in 1997, Russia in 
1998 and Argentina in 2001 to mention a few. The fact that many of the affected countries 
were emerging economies has fuelled the debate about the adequacy of different exchange 
rate regimes. At the same time, the capital markets have experienced a period of drastic 
deregulation and as a result adjustable pegs have lost in popularity (Salvatore, Dean & 
Willett, 2003). The world has developed a bipolar view where two extremes – hard pegs or 
freely floating exchange rates – are seen as the only prudent options (Eichengreen, 2003). 
The most extreme peg – if it can still be called that – is a total abolishment of the national 
currency, a phenomenon called dollarization. This has been put into practice in several small 
countries or territories, among others in Panama in 1904. Much research has been done, but 
one major concern is the lack of data for most small countries. Since Ecuador and El Salvador 
dollarized just over a decade ago, the possibility to study the effects of dollarization has 
greatly improved.  
Our study initially offers a general overview of how the most important macroeconomic 
aspects have been affected in Ecuador and El Salvador. The variables analyzed are inflation, 
interest rate and GDP growth. We compare the means and volatility in two time periods, 
before and after dollarization, to see if the variables have changed significantly. We observe 
significant decreases in inflation and interest rate which is in line with theory and previous 
research. Our results regarding changes in GDP growth rate are inconsistent: it increased in 
Ecuador after dollarization but decreased in El Salvador. Additionally, we examine the 
controversial question whether dollarization leads to increased trade within the dollar bloc. 
We use a gravity model to analyze bilateral trade flows and find no evidence of increased 
trade.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: the first section offers an introduction to the 
field of dollarization and provides an understanding for the time period prior to the 
dollarization in each country. Further, it elucidates the research questions and the 
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delimitations of the study. Section 2 contains a theory section and a literature review. Section 
3 presents our data and methodology. In Section 4 results are presented and analyzed. Lastly, 
main conclusions are summarized in Section 5 together with an outlook for further research.  
 
1.2 Background 
Ecuador and El Salvador, the two countries studied in this thesis, adopted the US dollar for 
entirely different reasons. In Ecuador a severe banking and financial crisis led to the 
abandoning of the national currency Sucre in early 2000. A general lack of trust in the 
economic system and the currency led to very high levels of inflation during 1998 and 1999 
(Abrego, Flores, Pivovarsky & Rother, 2006). Dollarization can be seen as a desperate 
measure to end the crisis and the US dollar was regarded as the only option credible enough. 
El Salvador, on the other hand, adopted the US dollar as part of a planned economic 
transformation. After a long civil war ending in 1992 the country undertook several measures 
to open up and stimulate the economy. Official dollarization proceeded with great speed in 
early 2001 (Swiston, 2011).  
These two particular countries offer a good opportunity to study different reasons to 
choose dollarization. It also provides the possibility to observe what effects dollarization has 
had in the two economies. Compared with Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador adopted the US 
dollar much later which facilitates the data collection process in terms of availability and 
accuracy. Furthermore, more research has been done on the dollarization in Panama than in 
Ecuador and El Salvador.  
 
1.2.1 Ecuador 
Ecuador’s economy underwent a troublesome time in the 1990s. The external debt amounted 
to 77% of the country’s GDP and poverty was widespread and increasing1. The labor market 
experienced low mobility and the tax system lacked sufficient regulation and transparency. 
The banking system became weakened and did not recover due to weak control and 
supervision. In addition, the government focused on bailing out banks in trouble rather than 
solving the root causes. This fact and additional inappropriate political policies laid the 
foundation of an almost stagnant GDP growth per capita during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Offerdal et al., 2000). Furthermore, Ecuador’s dependency on oil export made the country 
                                                        
1 According to estimations by Offerdal et al. (2000) about 40% of the population lived in poverty in 1999.   
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vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices (CIA, 2013). A lack of trust in the economic 
system, the currency and the banking system caused inflation to reach dangerously high levels 
at the end of the 1990s (Jacome H, 2004). Altogether, this made the economy vulnerable to 
economic shocks. 
Severe storms known as El Niño struck Ecuador in 1997 devastating much of the country’s 
infrastructure and crops. The damages were estimated to about 13% of 1998 GDP and 
reduced total exports by 20%. Around this time, several drops in world oil prices following 
the Asian currency crisis damaged Ecuador’s economy. Lastly, the Russian crisis in late 1998 
caused instability on the international financial markets. As a result Ecuador’s banking system 
experienced greater difficulties receiving loans from foreign banks (Offerdal et al., 2000). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000 numerous measures were taken to deal with the ongoing 
crisis. The government launched a general bank restructuring strategy which turned out 
inadequate and thus aggravated factors such as liquidity, solvency and profitability. A severe 
depreciation of the Sucre followed and ultimately led to the implementation of the US dollar, 
officially announced on January 10th 2000. The conversion rate was set to 25 000 Sucre per 
US dollar, amounting to a depreciation by 460% compared to 1998
2
 (Offerdal et al., 2000).  
As a consequence of the financial and banking crisis 16 financial institutions were either 
put under government control or closed down. Non-performing loans had risen to 45% of 
total outstanding loans by January 2000 (Offerdal et al., 2000). An estimation by Quintyn and 
Hoelscher (2003) showed that the costs of the crisis amounted to almost 22% of GDP, putting 
the GDP per capita back to the level of 1977 (Jacome H, 2004).  
 
1.2.2 El Salvador 
The reasons for dollarizing in El Salvador differed considerably from those of Ecuador. In El 
Salvador a twelve-year-long civil war was ended with a peace agreement signed in 1992. 
Consequently, living conditions began to improve. Reforms of the pension system, a lowering 
of import tariffs and privatization of major sectors such as banking and telecommunication 
were implemented to open up the economy to attract foreign investments (U.S. Department of 
State, 2002). El Salvador grew steadily and had among the lowest interest rates in Latin 
America (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004). Another major difference compared with Ecuador was 
the inflation. In El Salvador it remained fairly stable during the 1990s, averaging at about 
10%.  
                                                        
2 Authors’ calculations. 
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Since none of the more common reasons to dollarize (such as uncontrolled inflation or 
economic crisis) were present as in Ecuador and since there were no clear signs of economic 
distress, one might wonder why El Salvador decided to dollarize. The official reason given by 
the government was that dollarization would lead to lower interest rates, increases in foreign 
direct investments and lower transaction costs and hence stimulate economic growth (Towers 
& Borzutzky, 2004). A peg had been maintained since 1993 and the government argued that 
dollarization was the next rational step to take (Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 2006).  
Approximately 1.5 million Salvadorans lived in the US at the time of dollarization. 
Remittances sent back to El Salvador amounted to more than 1.9 billion dollars, equivalent to 
about 15% of GDP in 2001 (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004). Additionally, trade with the US 
constituted the major part of El Salvador’s export and import (U.S. Department of State, 
2002). The elimination of currency risk and exchange transaction cost that remittances and 
trade were exposed to would surely benefit the population and the economy. 
However, the government’s arguments for dollarization have been questioned. Towers and 
Borzutzky (2004) claim that among wealthy and heavily influential groups an unofficial will 
to dollarize thrived as it would benefit themselves: “Ultimately, the policy is simply a 
reflection of the nature of a political system which, although it is formally a democracy, 
continues to serve mostly the interest of a small oligarchy” (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004, p. 
30). Similar arguments about the skewed effects of dollarization in El Salvador can also be 
found in Proceso, a political newsmagazine printed in Mexico. About one year after 
dollarization they wrote, “The most beneficiated sector from the dollarization process has 
been the financial system” (Proceso, 2002). 
In summary, the reasons for El Salvador to dollarize were not as obvious as for Ecuador. 
Arguments made by the government and the president indicate that a lowering of the interest 
rates and an increase in foreign investment were the purpose of dollarization. At the same 
time, one must be skeptical and critical in order to see if these were the only reasons or if 
there might have been some other personal interests that resulted in dollarization.  
 
1.3 Purpose and Contribution 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of dollarization on a number of 
macroeconomic variables. We analyze Ecuador and El Salvador which both dollarized in the 
beginning of the 21st century but for entirely different reasons. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensible overview of the subject where Ecuador and El Salvador's individual 
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preconditions are thoroughly considered. Furthermore, we use a gravity model to analyze how 
trade flows within the dollar bloc are affected by dollarization. We focus on the field of 
dollarization since its body of research is much smaller than that of currency unions in 
general.  
 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The thesis contains two approaches. The first offers a macroeconomic overview of the 
consequences of dollarization. The variables investigated are inflation, interest rate and GDP 
growth (for detailed definitions see Section 3.2 and Appendix A). We assess whether the 
values of the variables have changed significantly after dollarization and evaluate changes in 
volatility for each variable. Thereafter, we study the correlation in business cycles between 
the dollarizer and the host country. In the second approach, we analyze bilateral trade flows 
within the dollar bloc using a gravity regression model. The research questions are 
summarized below. 
 
1.4.1 Average 
1. Average Inflation 
H0: Average rate of inflation has not changed after dollarization 
H1: Average rate of inflation is lower after dollarization 
  
2. Average Interest Rate 
H0: Average interest rate has not changed after dollarization 
H1: Average interest rate is lower after dollarization 
 
3. Average GDP growth rate  
H0: Average GDP growth rate has not changed after dollarization 
H1: Average GDP growth rate has changed after dollarization 
 
1.4.2 Volatility 
4. Inflation volatility 
H0: Inflation volatility has not changed after dollarization 
H1: Inflation volatility is lower after dollarization 
 
5. Interest Rate volatility 
H0: Interest Rate volatility has not changed after dollarization 
H1: Interest Rate volatility has changed after dollarization 
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6. GDP growth volatility  
H0: GDP growth rate volatility has not changed after dollarization 
H1: GDP growth rate volatility is higher after dollarization 
 
1.4.3 Correlation  
Earlier empirical studies on the business cycle correlation between a dollarized country and 
the host country have shown ambiguous results. We follow Engel and Rose (2000) and 
Swiston (2011) and expect the correlation to increase after dollarization. To study the 
correlation we use GDP growth rate as a proxy.  
 
1.4.4 Trade 
We investigate whether the bilateral trade patterns have changed due to dollarization. In 
theory, trade is expected to increase when a common currency is introduced and transaction 
costs decrease. Thus, trade between Ecuador and El Salvador and the dollar bloc is expected 
to increase. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
Initially, focus lies on the dollarization process in two particular countries in Latin America. 
We do not examine dollarization in general. By focusing only on two countries more effort 
can be concentrated on examining the country-specific reasons for dollarizing and the 
arguments underlying the decision. No attempt is made to isolate the effect of dollarization 
due to the complex structure of the macroeconomic variables.  
Thereafter, we use a static gravity model to evaluate trade flows. The model comprises the 
three largest dollarized countries in Latin America (Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador) and 
the US. Due to time and data limitations the very small dollarized countries in Latin America 
were not included.  
The time period stretches from 1990 to 2013 with some exceptions. The frequency of the 
data is determined by the available data. Higher frequency data would have been preferable 
but is in many cases not accessible. 
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2 Theory and Literature Review 
2.1 Dollarization and its Consequences  
In the beginning of the 1960s the Canadian economist Robert Mundell introduced the theory 
of optimum currency areas. The theory ascertains under which conditions a region can be 
considered an optimum currency area. Too large differences within a currency union would 
cause difficulties in keeping the union together when exposed to shocks, since countries 
would be affected asymmetrically (Mundell, 1961, Fregert & Jonung, 2010). 
Currency unions can be divided into two groups: those inventing a new currency or those 
adopting a foreign currency as their own. The latter is called dollarization. It is important to 
note that the foreign currency adopted does not need to be the US dollar. Other currencies 
used for this purpose are the Australian dollar, the Swiss franc and the Euro (Edwards, 2001, 
Schuler, 2005). 
Generally, a distinction is made between unofficial (de facto) and official (de jure) 
dollarization. The first appears when residents in a country lose confidence in the national 
currency, often due to high inflation, and therefore choose to hold a foreign currency parallel 
with the national. In this case there is an often unknown amount of foreign currency in 
circulation even though it is not used as legal tender (Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 2006). 
Unofficial dollarization is widespread in Latin America and the foreign currency relied upon 
is mainly the US dollar. A common way to assess the degree of dollarization is to calculate 
the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total bank deposits. Naturally, the level of 
dollarization differs widely but some countries have had extremely high shares of foreign 
currency deposits; Bolivia and Paraguay reached 93% and 66% respectively before they 
managed to change this runaway trend in the first years of the 21st century. Other countries in 
the region have seen downward trends in the last decade as well, which might be an effect of 
lower inflation alongside improved economic and financial policies (Cartas, 2010). 
Official dollarization is uncommon and occurs only when a country adopts a foreign 
currency as legal tender. Throughout this thesis we refer to official dollarization when 
discussing the concept. In this case the national currency is phased out and replaced by a 
foreign currency as the unit of account and means of payment (Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 
2006). Panama underwent this procedure as early as 1904 and Ecuador and El Salvador 
followed suit about a century later. These two countries are considerably larger than many 
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other dollarizers and have more accurate and available data, which facilitates research 
regarding dollarization.  
 
2.1.1 The Risk Premium 
One immediate consequence of dollarization is the elimination of currency risk generated by 
depreciations or devaluations, and hence a lowering of interest rates (Berg & Borensztein, 
2003). Countries with low creditworthiness often face considerably higher interest rates due 
to risk premiums than countries which are regarded as trustworthy. Investors need to be 
compensated for both currency risk and default risk. By adopting a foreign currency the 
interest rates converge to the rates in the host country. Dollarization also reduces inflation 
(see Section 2.1.4) which helps keep the interest rates low (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004). 
However, even if dollarization eliminates currency risk, differences in interest rates 
between the dollarized country and the host country are likely to persist due to country 
specific factors. Dollarization does not solve the problem with default risk which varies from 
country to country. Hence, the risk premium on dollar denominated assets can be very 
different. Due to risk for political and/or fiscal instability investors might be unwilling to 
invest. This lowers the government’s income and might cause financial problems. To lower 
the risk premium due to default risk and to be seen as a trustworthy place to invest, a country 
needs to do much more than to dollarize (Berg & Borensztein, 2003, Cooper, 2004). For a 
thorough discussion on currency and default risk see Goldfajn and Olivares (2000).  
For the central bank of a dollarized country the possibility to independently set the repo 
rate to smooth business cycle fluctuations disappears. Hence, the cost of dollarization will be 
lower the higher the business cycle correlation is between the dollarizer and the host. 
However, it is also possible that the correlation increases after dollarization as a consequence 
of deeper economic integration (Alesina & Barro, 2001, Swiston, 2011). Similarly, Goldfajn 
and Olivares (2000) question whether lower domestic interest rates are in fact a result of 
dollarization or of other factors which make the banking system more competitive. 
 
2.1.2 Economic Integration 
Most official dollarizations have taken place in countries with an open economy and strong 
economic ties to the host country. A country that adopts the US dollar becomes per definition 
a part of the dollar bloc and benefits from lower costs for all transactions within the bloc. 
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Lower costs and deeper integration facilitate trade. Hence, trade with other dollar countries is 
expected to increase as a result of dollarization (Alesina & Barro, 2002, Cooper, 2004, Klein, 
2005). 
Dollarization is also likely to deepen financial integration and make the financial system 
more competitive. This is outside the scope of this thesis and for further discussion we refer to 
Quispe-Agnoli and Whisler (2006). 
 
2.1.3 Growth  
There are two different ways of arguing about dollarization and growth. On the one hand, a 
dollarized country could enjoy a higher growth rate in real GDP due to lower inflation and 
interest rates and increased investments and trade. On the other hand, it might become 
difficult to absorb external shocks when a smoothing monetary policy is absent. This could 
cause instability in a dollarized country and slow down the economic growth (Edwards & 
Magendzo, 2003). Since the theory is ambiguous it is necessary to turn to empirical studies 
(see Section 2.3).  
Another risk of dollarization is that it could lead to greater fluctuations in GDP growth. If 
fiscal policy is not counter-cyclical enough and if the labor market is not very flexible, the 
country might need to adjust to external shocks through fluctuations in output and/or 
employment. In this case dollarization would cause GDP growth to be more volatile than in 
countries with a national currency (Goldfajn & Olivares, 2000). 
 
2.1.4 Inflation 
One common characteristic of dollarizers is the poor record of inflation targeting. With a lack 
of credibility for the national currency, both domestically and internationally, dollarization 
might be tempting. Dollarization is equivalent to delegating the responsibility for monetary 
and exchange rate policy to the central bank in the host country. A dollarized country has to 
accommodate to the host country’s policies and acknowledge their own inability to stabilize 
the price level (Cooper, 2004). As long as inflation is low in the host country, it tends to be 
similar in the dollarized country (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004). 
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2.2 The Gravity Model 
The gravity model was first introduced by the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen in 1962. He 
had a background in theoretical physics from where the gravity model’s name was inspired. 
The essential explanatory variables of a gravity model are distance and GDP. Tinbergen 
argued that larger economies trade more and that the transaction costs (proxied by distance) 
are higher for countries which are geographically far away from each other. Hence, bilateral 
trade is modeled as a positive function of two countries’ combined income and a negative 
function of the distance between them. After Tinbergen’s initial model, augmented versions 
of the gravity model have been widely used to investigate trade flows (De Benedictis & 
Taglioni, 2011). 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
In the field of dollarization all economists face one common problem, namely the lack of 
accessible data. Edwards (2001) lists a dozen countries which have experienced periods with 
official dollarization after 1970. The largest among them are Liberia and Panama with 
populations of about three million. The remaining countries are the size of Andorra, 
Liechtenstein or Micronesia. Edwards and Magendzo (2003, p. 5) write: “…most strictly 
dollarized countries are very small and their data are not included in readily available data 
sets”. Despite this, economists have succeeded to realize a fairly large body of research about 
dollarization.  
As mentioned above, interest rates are expected to decrease after dollarization, an effect on 
which most economists agree. Dornbusch (2001, p. 5) writes “[f]irst and most obviously, 
there is a dramatic decline in interest rates”. For instance, Swiston (2011) tries to isolate the 
effects dollarization had on the interest rate in El Salvador. He uses an uncovered interest 
parity condition together with the Taylor rule and finds that the reduced currency risk lowered 
short term lending and deposit rates by 4 to 5 percentage points.  
Another point which economists agree on is inflation. Empirical studies have shown 
unequivocal evidence: dollarization is an utmost effective measure against high inflation 
(Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry & Wolf, 1997, Goldfajn & Olivares, 2000). However, even if 
dollarization is a great help in reducing inflation it can in some cases take several years, as 
was the case for Ecuador (pointed out by Quispe-Agnoli and Whisler (2006)). Quispe-Agnoli 
and Whisler (2006) show that also inflation volatility was reduced in Ecuador after 
dollarization. This is in line with the findings of Ghosh et al. (1997) who find that countries 
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with fixed exchange rates have inflation rates of about 5 percentage points lower than others. 
Using an AR1 regression model they also find evidence of lower inflation volatility.  
Regarding trade and economic integration, several empirical studies have shown that a 
common currency increases trade. Rose has argued in this direction together with several 
coauthors. Engel and Rose (2000) use a gravity model and estimate that trade is 285% higher 
between countries in a currency union than in countries with a national currency. One 
drawback of their data set is that only 16 of 146 of the observed transitions (countries entering 
or exiting a currency union) are entries. This raises the question whether their research can be 
applied to entries as well or if it only confirms a decreasing trade when a country exits a 
currency union.  
Glick and Rose (2002) use another panel data set containing data for 200 countries over 50 
years. They argue that a common currency nearly doubles the bilateral trade. They use both 
OLS and fixed effects and find significant increases in trade with both methods, even though 
the fixed effects estimator is smaller. Together with van Wincoop, Rose conducts robustness 
checks which strengthens the validity of his first results (Rose & Van Wincoop, 2001). 
However, Rose has been criticized by Edwards and Magendzo (2003) for treating all kinds of 
currency unions alike although there are big differences between them. They claim that there 
are “important differences in terms of independence of monetary policy, seigniorage, and 
capacity to absorb external shocks” (2003, p. 4). Moreover, the panel data set used by Rose 
and Van Wincoop (2001) and Glick and Rose (2002) contains data on very few dollarized 
countries. It is uncertain if these results can be ascribed to dollarized countries. 
Edwards and Magendzo (2003) distinguish between officially dollarized countries and 
other currency unions in their research regarding inflation, volatility and growth. 
Unfortunately, their research does not include trade. Klein (2005) revisits the data set from 
Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and Glick and Rose (2002) but focuses on dollarized countries 
in Latin America. Klein finds no evidence of increased trade due to dollarization and 
seriously questions the relevance of Rose’s research for nations considering dollarization.   
Another aspect of integration is the correlation between business cycles in different 
countries. Engel and Rose (2000) use panel data to compute correlation in output and find a 
slightly higher correlation between countries with shared currency than countries with their 
own currency. Further, Swiston (2011) compares the output in El Salvador and the US and 
argues that dollarization led to higher correlation in business cycles. On the other hand, 
Lindenberg and Westermann (2012) test for common serial correlation and find no evidence 
that confirms co-movements in the business cycles in Central America and the US. 
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The last effect of dollarization is GDP growth. Edwards and Magendzo (2001, 2003) 
analyze whether dollarized countries have experienced higher growth compared to countries 
maintaining a currency of their own. Edwards and Magendzo (2001) use a matching estimator 
technique and find that dollarized countries have lower growth than those with a national 
currency. Edwards and Magendzo (2003) use a treatment regression with a dollarization 
dummy included but they never obtain a significant coefficient for the dollarization dummy. 
The same result is found by Edwards and Magendzo (2006). Also according to Eichengreen 
(2003) it is uncertain whether dollarization increases growth.  
The evidence is also ambiguous regarding growth volatility; Edwards and Magendzo 
(2001) find no evidence of higher volatility but Edwards and Magendzo (2003, 2006) do. 
Ghosh et al. (1997) use a large panel data set and thoroughly evaluate all different types of 
exchange rate regimes. Their conclusion is that countries with pegs have lower inflation at the 
cost of higher real volatility. 
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3 Methodology and Data  
3.1 Methodology 
In order to obtain a good overview and assess whether changes occurred in inflation, interest 
rate and GDP growth we test for differences in means and volatility between the period before 
dollarization (BD) and after dollarization (AD). Additionally, we compare the correlation in 
the business cycles between the dollarized country and the US. Thereafter, we use a gravity 
model to investigate whether dollarization led to an increase in trade within the dollar bloc.  
 
3.1.1 Comparison of Means 
To compare the mean of a variable before and after dollarization was realized and to identify 
significant changes, we use a comparison of means test. Observations of variables which 
experienced violent movements in the time period surrounding the dollarization moment were 
excluded from the calculations. This was done to avoid misleading results. The comparison of 
means test is calculated using equation ( 1 ) where     is the mean,   
  is the variance and    is 
the number of observations in time period i (BD and AD). Retrieved Z-values are compared 
to critical values found in a Z-table (see Appendix B). 
 
 
  
      
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
( 1 ) 
 
3.1.2 Volatility 
We follow Edwards and Magendzo (2003) and define volatility as the standard deviation of a 
variable. To test for changes in volatility we use equation ( 2 ) and an F-distribution (see 
Appendix B). The larger of the two variances is placed in the nominator and retrieved F-
values are compared to critical values found in an F-table (see Appendix B). 
 
   
  
 
  
  ( 2 ) 
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3.1.3 Correlation 
We use the GDP growth rate as proxy for business cycles as suggested by Lindenberg and 
Westermann (2012). Correlation in business cycles is calculated with equation ( 3 ) where 
        is the covariance between country X and Y and    is the standard deviation of 
country i. 
           
        
    
 ( 3 ) 
 
3.1.4 The Gravity Regression Model 
In our regression we use a gravity model where trade is modeled proportionally to GDP and 
inverse proportionally to distance. To construct our model we follow Glick and Rose (2002). 
The main difference is that we focus only on dollarized countries and the US, whereas Glick 
and Rose study currency unions in general. Where they use a binary variable to indicate a 
currency union we use it to indicate an officially dollarized country. Due to our small data set 
we exclude a couple of the binary variables in Glick and Rose’s model for which we would 
have had no variation
3
.  
Our data set consists of nominal variables since this is most common and for technical 
reasons more accurate than real values (De Benedictis & Taglioni, 2011). Trade is modeled as 
shown in equation ( 4 ). The model is a pooled OLS regression which contains both a cross 
sectional dimension (i and j) and a time dimension (t). A cross sectional approach would have 
answered the question “Do dollarized countries trade more with countries within the dollar 
bloc than with countries outside?” A panel data set offers an answer to the more interesting 
question whether dollarization, i.e. an entering into the dollar bloc, increases trade with other 
countries using the US dollar.  
 
 
                                             
                                        
                      
 
( 4 ) 
 
The parameter of interest is   . i and j denote countries, t denotes time and the variables are 
defined as follows: 
                                                        
3 Excluded are for instance binary variables describing the colonial past or if a country is an island or 
landlocked.  
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TRADE is the average
4
 trade between country i and j at time t. Measured in nominal values 
and millions of US dollar. 
GDP is nominal GDP measured in millions of US dollar. 
Dist is the distance between country i and j measured in kilometers from middle to middle. 
Com lang is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j have a common language. 
FTA is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j have signed a free trade agreement at 
time t.  
Dollarized is a binary variable which is unity if country i and j use the US dollar as legal 
tender at time t. 
 
3.2 Data 
As demonstrated in Section 2 dollarization influences a large number of fundamental 
macroeconomic variables.  
Table 1. Variable description 
Variable Description Interval and Frequency 
Number of 
observations 
Source 
Ecuador 
    
GDP growth* The % Growth Rate of Real GDP Q1 1992 – Q4 2012 Quarterly 84 IFS 
Interest Rate, 
Sucre** 
The Lending Rate Jan 1990 – Jul 2008 Monthly 223 IFS 
Inflation* CPI % change Jan 1990 – Oct 2013 Monthly 286 IFS 
El Salvador 
    
GDP growth* The % Growth Rate of Real GDP Q1 1991 – Q2 2013 Quarterly 90 BCR 
Interest Rate, 
Colon*** 
The Lending Rate Jan 1991 – Oct 2013 Monthly 274 BCR 
Interest Rate, 
US dollar 
The Lending Rate Jan 1995 – Oct 2013 Monthly 226 BCR 
Inflation* CPI % change Jan 1990 – Oct 2013 Monthly 286 IFS 
United States     
GDP growth* The % Growth Rate of Real GDP Q1 1990 – Q3 2013 Quarterly 95 IFS 
Interest Rate, 
US dollar 
The Lending Rate Jan 1990 – Oct 2013 Monthly 286 IFS 
Inflation* CPI % change Jan 1990 – Sep 2013 Monthly 285 IFS 
(*) Percentage changes are calculated as the change over the corresponding period of the previous year. The 
GDP growth rate for El Salvador has been calculated using real GDP values for El Salvador. (**) The Sucre 
interest rate for Ecuador ranges from 1990 until December 1998. After this date the rate is expressed in US 
dollar. (***) The Colon interest rate for El Salvador ranges from 1991 until January 2001. Thereafter the rate is 
expressed in US dollar and is for that reason the same as the US dollar rate. For a full explanation of the 
variables, see Appendix A.  
 
                                                        
4 The average is calculated as the sum of country i’s reported export to and import from country j and 
country j’s reported export to and import from country i, divided by four.   
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In our first approach, which evaluates mean, volatility and correlation, we use the data 
presented in Table 1. The data set contains GDP growth, interest rates and inflation. The data 
is collected from the IMF’s database International Financial Statistics (IFS) and from the 
Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador (BCR). The number of observations for each variable 
ranges from 84 to 286 on a quarterly or monthly basis. One missing value on the lending rate 
in Ecuador in August 2007 has been interpolated. Exact definitions of each variable are found 
in Appendix A. 
In our second approach, we estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the 
gravity model using a balanced panel data set with quarterly data for four countries: Ecuador 
and El Salvador as main foci, Panama because of its long history of being a dollarized 
country, and the US because of its role as host country. Mean and standard deviation for 
dollarized and non-dollarized observations are presented in Table 2. The time period stretches 
from 1991 to 2012. Values for GDP growth in Panama, which is only measured annually, 
have been interpolated.  
 
  Table 2. Descriptive statistics: regression 
 Non-dollarized Dollarized 
Observations 192 336 
ln(TRADEijt) 
3.34 
(2.28) 
4.93 
(1.56) 
ln(GDPiGDPj)t 
19.54 
(3.56) 
22.36 
(3.59) 
ln(DISTij) 
7.60 
(.54) 
7.76 
(.53) 
ln(AREAiAREAj) 
24.36 
(2.64) 
24.24 
(2.61) 
Common language dummy, com lang 
.60 
(.49) 
.44 
(.50) 
Free Trade Agreement dummy, FTA 
0 
(0) 
.29 
(.46) 
Dollarization dummy, dollarized 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
 Mean with standard deviation in parentheses.  
 
3.3 Criticism of the Method 
The main problem with the comparison of means test and the volatility test is that they are 
essentially developed for cross sectional approaches. The tests require independent and 
identically distributed (IID) variables. In time series the independent part is rarely fulfilled 
since the last period is likely to affect the current. Furthermore, if means and standard 
deviations are different in the two time periods, the assumption about identical distribution is 
violated. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with caution.  
17 
 
Likewise, the gravity model approach has its shortcomings. First, it assumes a linear 
relationship between distance and trading costs. There is no reason to believe that this holds in 
reality. Second, the gravity model is most commonly designed as a static model and so is 
ours. A static model only allows for contemporaneous effects even though economic 
arguments support the view of trade as a dynamic variable. This might cause a negative bias. 
The solution is to allow for lagged effects, which is outside the scope of this thesis due to time 
constraints. For the same reason, the fact that a shared time trend can cause spurious 
regression problems is not taken into account. 
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4 Results and Analysis 
4.1 Macroeconomic Overview 
In this section we present the results of the means and volatility tests and also correlations of 
business cycles. The results are found in Table 3. Average, volatility and correlation are 
calculated for Ecuador and El Salvador in the time periods BD and AD. Results for the US are 
 
 Table 3. Descriptive statistics: average, volatility and correlation 
 Ecuador El Salvador US 
CPI, %    
Average entire period 20.65 6.32 2.69 
Average BD / AD  39.09 / 5.07 9.90 / 3.26  
Z-value 29.13 9.83  
Standard deviation entire period 19.07 6.29 1.26 
Standard deviation BD / AD 12.45 / 3.22 7.47 / 2.30  
F-value 14.94 10.51  
LENDING RATE, NATIONAL 
CURRENCY, % 
   
Average entire period 30.57 11.64 6.38 
Average BD / AD* 45.63 / 13.02 17.27 / 7.25  
Z-value 28.30 44.76  
Standard deviation entire period 18.67 5.27 2.23 
Standard deviation BD / AD* 12.20 / 3.01 2.17 / 1.29  
F-value 16.45 2.83  
LENDING RATE, US DOLLARS, %    
Average entire period  8.48  
Average BD / AD*  11.12 / 7.25  
Z-value  26.32  
Standard deviation entire period  2.18  
Standard deviation BD / AD*  1.06 / 1.29  
F-value  1.22  
GDP GROWTH RATE, %    
Average entire period 3.90 3.12 2.47 
Average BD / AD 2.79 / 4.49 4.63 / 1.91  
Z-value 3.54 6.45  
Standard deviation entire period 2.46 2.37 1.88 
Standard deviation BD / AD 1.65 / 2.61 2.10 / 1.82  
F-value 2.49 1.33  
Correlation with US, entire period .09 .54  
Correlation with US BD / AD .12 / .31 -.09 / .77  
(*) Due to dollarization, these values for El Salvador are the same in the period after dollarization.  
Bold indicates significance at 5%. 
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presented for the entire time period (1990-2013) as reference values. Table 4 summarizes 
answers to the hypotheses in Section 1.4. 
 
Table 4. Answers to hypotheses 
Hypothesis Ecuador El Salvador 
1. Lower average inflation confirmed confirmed 
2. Lower average interest rate;  domestic currency 
                                                  US dollar 
confirmed 
- 
confirmed 
confirmed 
3. Changed GDP growth rate confirmed confirmed 
4. Lower inflation volatility confirmed confirmed 
5. Changed interest rate volatility;  domestic currency 
                                                        US dollar 
confirmed 
- 
confirmed 
not confirmed 
6. Higher GDP growth rate volatility confirmed not confirmed 
7. Increased business cycle correlation with the US confirmed confirmed 
8. Increased trade                                   not confirmed  
 
4.1.1 Inflation 
The comparison of means and volatility tests indicate significant decreases in mean and in 
volatility in both countries, i.e., the inflation rate and the inflation volatility were lower after 
dollarization than before. This confirms hypothesis one and four for both Ecuador and El 
Salvador.  
 
 
Figure 1. Inflation measured by CPI, % 
 
From Table 3 and Figure 1 we see that Ecuador suffered from very high levels of inflation 
throughout the period before dollarization. It started out high and dropped in 1992-1993 
which was mainly due to a stabilization program launched by the government to stimulate the 
economy and reduce inflation. The program used stable exchange rates as the major tool, 
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During the period of 1993-1997 the rate of inflation was fairly stable at around 20-25% but 
started to rise in 1998. During the financial crisis at the very end of the 1990s the inflation 
soared and in September 2000 it peaked at 108%. The extreme values between January 2000 
and December 2001 (24 observations) have been excluded in the calculations since they do 
not reflect the general trend or level in the country at that time. Including these observations 
would cause an upward bias on the average rate of inflation after dollarization in January 
2000.  
When a country adopts another country’s currency as legal tender, the rate of inflation is 
expected to be similar to the rate in the host country (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004). 
Dollarization caused the inflation in Ecuador to fall, even though an adjustment period was 
necessary to turn the upward trend and for the inflation to reach US levels. Inflation reached a 
one-digit number in November 2002 for the first time in our sample period. Quispe-Agnoli 
and Whisler (2006) study inflation in Ecuador and find that it reached single-digit numbers in 
2003 for the first time since 1972. The small difference in findings is probably caused by 
disparities in the way of defining inflation. We use percentage change in CPI and in Quispe-
Agnoli and Whisler’s article no definition is given. 
One possible explanation for the adjustment period is that inflation was still increasing in 
January 2000, the time of dollarization. It is plausible that it took some time to reverse the 
trend. This argument is stressed by Abrego et al. (2006). Another possible explanation is that 
prices are sticky and need time to adjust. In Ecuador, sticky prices could be due to for 
example price regulations or an inefficient labor market which is emphasized by Offerdal et 
al. (2000) as factors underlying the crisis in the Ecuadorian economy at this time. However, 
since 2004 the level of inflation has been roughly the same as in the US. Since the inflation 
lowering measures undertaken by the government were inadequate (see discussion in Section 
1.2.1) no other likely explanation remains than that the new currency caused inflation to fall. 
Inflation volatility decreased significantly in Ecuador; the standard deviation dropped from 
12.5% before dollarization to only 3.2% after dollarization. This is in line with the findings of 
Abrego et al. (2006) among others. Our method does not isolate a causal effect but the drop in 
volatility could be explained by the increased trustworthiness following dollarization. The 
Sucre had lost its credibility and with the implementation of the US dollar the inflation and 
volatility rates converged towards those of the US.  
El Salvador on the other hand never experienced levels of inflation as high as in Ecuador. 
Since the end of 1993, inflation was stable and decreasing, reaching US levels even before 
official dollarization in January 2001. Between April 1999 and December 2000 the inflation 
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in El Salvador was even lower than in the US. Around the time of dollarization it caught up 
and exceeded the US level and a time period with inflation higher than in the US followed. 
Towers and Borzutzky (2004) discuss the rounding up of prices as a possible contributor to 
this increase. In informal markets, where most poor citizens operate, rounding up was 
common. Since the exchange rate was 8.79 Colones to the dollar at the time of dollarization, 
the exchange rate was most likely rounded up to nine Colones to the dollar, either for 
simplicity or profit considerations. 
The test regarding inflation volatility shows a significant decrease after dollarization, 
volatility dropped from 7.5% to 2.3%. However, both inflation and inflation volatility in El 
Salvador had downward trends even before dollarization. Therefore, the decreases cannot be 
assigned to dollarization only. Our method does not isolate any causal effects of dollarization 
and changes in inflation rate and volatility are affected by many other factors. For instance, 
the Salvadoran government implemented programs and reforms to promote and stabilize 
economic growth and improve the general economic situation. Hence, the effect of 
dollarization on inflation is not as clear in El Salvador as in Ecuador.  
 
4.1.2 Interest Rate  
The results regarding changes in lending rate are similar for both countries. The comparison 
of means and volatility tests turn out significant for the domestic currency lending rate, 
confirming hypothesis two and five for both Ecuador and El Salvador. Interest rate and 
volatility decreased in both countries.  
 
 
Figure 2. Lending rate, domestic currency, % 
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Ecuador’s lending rate in Figure 2 is volatile in the period before dollarization and displays a 
remarkable drop in January 1999. This drop cannot be explained by dollarization which was 
not realized until January 2000, one year later. The drop is due to a change in the unit of 
measurement. Until December 1998 the interest rate refers to short loans in the national 
currency Sucre. From January 1999 and onward it refers to short loans issued in US dollar. 
Since we have been unable to find data on the US dollar rate in Ecuador before dollarization 
the results and analysis need to be based on this rate published by the IMF as “domestic 
lending rate” even though it in fact consists of two different currencies.  
In the beginning of the 1990s the lending rate in Ecuador increased from about 35% to 
almost 80% in less than three years. The rate remains high and volatile until December 1998. 
Ecuador went through a troublesome time during the second part of the 1990s which caused 
very high interest rates. After the change in unit of measurement in January 1999 and after 
dollarization in January 2000 the rate is significantly lower and much less volatile. The 
standard deviation dropped from 12.2% to 3.0%. A decrease in volatility indicates that the 
interest rate became less sensitive to changes brought on by macroeconomic shocks or 
international events. Surely, being less sensitive to economic shocks is an advantage. 
However, the rate in Ecuador stayed higher than in the US, something the government in 
Ecuador tried to adjust with structural reform programs. The rate took some time to decrease 
to the level of the US. As discussed in Section 2.1.1 the adoption of the US dollar is an 
insufficient measure for reaching interest levels as low as in the US. Because of country 
specific factors such as country risk, lender’s creditworthiness or supply and demand for 
loans, the US dollar rates in different countries are not identical. 
In the case of El Salvador, Figure 2 shows the Colon rate until December 2000 and 
thereafter the US dollar rate (all in red). The lending rate was considerably lower than in 
Ecuador and less volatile. Since El Salvador did not experience high rates of inflation or other 
macroeconomic disturbances it is natural to see a lower lending rate. The interest rate in El 
Salvador decreased even before dollarization which makes it hard to draw any clear 
conclusions about the casual effect of dollarization. After dollarization, the lending rate 
reached a level close to that of the US.  
However, even if lower lending rates are advantageous for individuals and companies, the 
comparison in Figure 2 is not just. Figure 2 shows the Sucre and Colon lending rates in the 
first half of the time period and the US dollar lending rate in the second half. Those currencies 
are inherently different. More interesting is Figure 3, which shows the US dollar lending rate 
in El Salvador for the entire time period. The rate expressed in dollars is about five to seven 
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percentage points lower than the rate expressed in Colones. Both lending rates decreased 
throughout the second half of the 1990s. As described in Section 1.2.2 El Salvador undertook 
several actions to improve the economic situation. As far as can be judged from the interest 
rate, these actions can be regarded as successful.  
Although downward trending, both rates drop shortly after dollarization in January 2001. 
Our findings on El Salvador are in line with those of Swiston (2011) who estimates that 
dollarization caused lending and deposit rates to drop by about 4 to 5 percentage points. For 
the US dollar lending rate, the comparison of means test indicates a significant drop in the 
average lending rate. However, with our method we cannot be certain whether this drop is due 
to dollarization or other actions undertaken to improve the economic situation. The volatility 
test shows no significant results. This means that hypothesis two is confirmed but not 
hypothesis five. 
 
 
Figure 3. Lending rate, US dollars for El Salvador, % 
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4.1.3 GDP Growth 
The results for Ecuador and El Salvador regarding real GDP growth and real growth volatility 
are contradictory. Ecuador experienced both higher average growth and growth volatility after 
dollarization. For El Salvador, the results are the opposite: both the average growth rate and 
the volatility decreased after dollarization. The comparison of means test shows significant 
results for both countries which confirms hypothesis three regarding a change in GDP growth. 
Hypothesis six assumes higher GDP growth volatility after dollarization and is confirmed in 
the case of Ecuador but not El Salvador. The business cycle correlation for Ecuador increased 
from 0.1 before dollarization to 0.3 after dollarization and for El Salvador from -0.1 to 0.8. 
Our findings regarding correlation are thus consistent with our expectations. 
 
 
Figure 4. GDP growth rate, % 
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spending. The citizens in Ecuador might have had high expectations in the US dollar and its 
potential to solve economic problems. 
From 2000 and forward, Figure 4 shows a higher average growth rate but it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of dollarization from the effects of the policy changes implemented 
around the time of dollarization in January 2000. These policy changes naturally needed some 
time to stimulate the economy. However, dollarization probably played an important part in 
turning a soaring rate of inflation and a negative growth rate into a high positive growth rate. 
As described in Section 2.1.3 the growth rate is affected by both inflation and interest rates. 
Hence, dollarization probably had an indirect positive effect on the growth rate.  
The volatility of the GDP growth increased significantly in Ecuador. The standard 
deviation changed from 1.7% to 2.6%. As discussed in Section 2.1.3, without independent 
monetary policy, the fiscal policy and the labor market have to be countercyclical and flexible 
in order to smooth the business cycle. Since Ecuador had some difficulties with this, it might 
be an explanation to the increased volatility. 
The financial crisis starting in the US in 2007 had, as depicted in Figure 4, a somewhat 
delayed effect on Ecuador. This delay may partially be explained by the low business cycle 
correlation with the US. The correlation was 0.1 before dollarization and 0.3 after 
dollarization. Even though it increased it was still low after dollarization and therefore the 
potential benefits of dollarization were lower for Ecuador than for El Salvador. The dollarized 
country loses the ability to conduct independent monetary policy and has to rely on the US for 
this matter. It cannot be expect that the US adjusts its monetary policy to the needs of the 
dollarized country. If the business cycles are not strongly correlated, the imported monetary 
policy may result in inappropriate actions to either stimulate or cool off the economy. Swiston 
(2011) highlights this fact. Perhaps the Ecuadorian business cycle has not been fully 
synchronized with that of the US, resulting in higher volatility of the business cycle after 
dollarization than before.  
In El Salvador the average growth rate decreased significantly, dropping from 4.6% before 
to 1.9% after dollarization. The government’s official reasons to adopt the US dollar were that 
it would lead to a higher economic growth rate, as discussed in Section 1.2.2. Clearly, this 
was not realized.  
The volatility of GDP growth declined from 2.1% to 1.8% in El Salvador, although not 
significantly. Hypothesis six assumes an increase in volatility after dollarization. One 
explanation to the drop in volatility is that the US monetary policy contributed to cyclical 
stabilization. This point is also highlighted by Swiston (2011). A higher correlation in 
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business cycles is also a probable contributor. The curves for El Salvador and the US show 
great resemblances in the after period. The correlation changed from -0.1 to 0.8. Since the 
mid 1990s, the two lines have been fairly synchronized. Worth noting are the very close co-
movements during the start of the recent financial crisis. Between mid 2008 and mid 2010 the 
lines are almost identical. The strong correlation with the US could be explained by the large 
share of trade that El Salvador has with the US. Of total exports in 2012, 47% was shipped to 
the US. The same number for Ecuador was 37%. Of total import, the shares were 35% and 
28% respectively (CIA, 2013). This means that El Salvador had closer and more developed 
trade links with the US and was therefore more sensitive to changes in US supply and 
demand. 
Furthermore, El Salvador and the US are both members of the free trade agreement 
CAFTA-DR since 2006 (CIA, 2013). This agreement aims at promoting trade and 
investments among the participants. Additionally, El Salvador is one of few countries in the 
world to participate in a program together with the US aimed at reducing crime and insecurity 
and promoting productivity, the Partnership for Growth Initiative. Working along with the 
US, several goals have been set in order to deal with these issues (U.S. Department of State, 
2002). Both these agreements with the US might help explain why El Salvador and the US 
have a stronger correlation in business cycles and tend to trade more, compared to Ecuador.  
Another possible explanation for the high correlation is the remittances sent back to 
families by Salvadorans working in the US. As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, the remittances 
amounted to about 15% of GDP in 2001 (Towers & Borzutzky, 2004). This share increased to 
17% of GDP in 2011 (CIA, 2013). This is a considerable portion of El Salvador’s GDP and 
the ties with the US have become even stronger. The size of the remittances sent to El 
Salvador depends on the business cycle and unemployment rate in the US. Since the US 
economy has grown mildly during the start of the millennia, and with the global recession 
starting in 2007, El Salvador also experienced a decrease in average growth.  
Finally, some additional events contributed to dampen growth in El Salvador in the period 
after dollarization. In 2001, two earthquakes coincided with an increase in oil prices and a 
decline in international coffee prices (Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 2006). None of these events 
were beneficial for the country’s growth rate. 
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4.2 Regression Results 
Our results from the gravity model do not support the theory of increasing trade due to a 
common currency for dollarized nations. The regression results are presented in Table 5. 
Column 1 includes only GDP and distance, the cornerstones in a gravity model. Both 
variables have expected signs (GDP is positive and distance negative) and are highly 
significant. This holds throughout all our regressions.  
 
 Table 5. Regression output 
  ln(TRADEij)    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(GDPiGDPj)t .585*** 
(.016) 
[.027] 
.574*** 
(.018) 
[.026] 
.419*** 
(.025) 
[.025] 
.699*** 
(.053) 
[.060] 
.710*** 
(.055) 
[.066] 
ln(DISTij) -.966*** 
(.114) 
[.162] 
-.917*** 
(.119) 
[.160] 
-1.639*** 
(.140) 
[.183] 
-1.185*** 
(.156) 
[.175] 
-1.192*** 
(.156) 
[.176] 
Dollar dummy 
 
.116* 
(.081) 
[.062] 
.349*** 
(.081) 
[.063] 
-.099 
(.109) 
[.090] 
-.094 
(.110) 
[.090] 
ln(AREAiAREAj) 
  
.361*** 
(.042) 
[.027] 
.296*** 
(.042) 
[.031] 
.281*** 
(.047) 
[.039] 
Common language 
   
2.161*** 
(.367) 
[.352] 
2.159*** 
(.367) 
[.348] 
Free Trade Agreement  
    
-.076 
(.108) 
[.103] 
Obs=528, R-squared= 0.87 for main regression in column 5. Standard deviation in parentheses, robust       
 standard deviations in brackets. Due to heteroskedasticity the significance level is calculated on robust     
 standard deviations. (*) significant at 10%, (**) significant at 5%, (***) significant at 1%. 
 
Recall from Section 2.3 that Engel and Rose (2000), Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and 
Glick and Rose (2002) argue that bilateral trade at least doubles when two countries are 
members of the same currency union. Our dollarization dummy is included in column 2 and 
its point estimate is very small, at least compared with the findings of Rose and his coauthors, 
and becomes insignificant when further control variables are included (column 4 and 5). 
Column 3 adds area which has a positive and significant point estimate as expected. Column 
4 includes a dummy for common language and column 5 a dummy for free trade agreement. 
As seen in column 5, a 1% increase in the combined GDP would increase bilateral trade by 
approximately 0.7%. Equally, a 1% increase in the combined area would increase trade by 
approximately 0.3%. Finally, a 1% increase in distance would decrease trade by 
approximately 1.2%. These results are not only statistically significant but economically 
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significant as well. It is clear that trade patterns to a certain extent are determined by distance, 
GDP and country size. 
The only insignificant variables in column 5 are the FTA dummy and the dollarization 
dummy. A free trade agreement would lower trade by approximately 7.6%. This result is 
unexpected and should be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, this dummy equals 
unity in only 18.5% of our observations. Second, differences in agreements are not taken into 
consideration. A reliable estimate of the effect of a free trade agreement on trade would need 
to consider the conditions of each agreement carefully. 
Worth noting is the very high point estimate for the common language dummy. According 
to this estimate a common language would increase trade by 766%
5
. This is most likely an 
overestimate due to omitted variable bias. Most importantly, the period of colonialism greatly 
influenced the political, economic and cultural spheres in the colony which all affect a 
country’s trade pattern. We assume that unobserved factors related to the colonial heritage 
from Spain are positively correlated with both the common language dummy and the bilateral 
trade between Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama. This gives the point estimate for common 
language an upward bias. However, without a detailed data set we cannot disentangle the 
effect on trade of these aspects from the effect of a common language. 
Glick and Rose (2002) use several control variables in their model for which we would 
have no variation. Therefore, these variables have been excluded. There is one though, which 
would have been possible for us to control for, namely the GDP per capita. This variable is 
expected to have a positive point estimate but turned out negative and significant and has 
therefore been excluded. The unexpected sign was most likely due to multicollinearity and a 
relatively small sample size. A certain degree of multicollinearity cannot be avoided since it is 
an inherent property of many macroeconomic variables to share an upward trend over time 
and hence be positively correlated (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). This is the case for variables 
such as population, GDP and trade. Multicollinearity does not need to be a problem as long 
as there is no (near) perfect linear relationship but it can result in variables obtaining the 
incorrect sign (O’brien, 2007). However, the point estimate for the dollarization dummy is 
very small and insignificant regardless of whether the GDP per capita is included or not. The 
gist of our results is that a common currency might not have a trade enhancing effect in the 
case of dollarized countries. 
                                                        
5                    
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The key argument behind the theory of increasing trade due to a common currency is lower 
transaction costs. However, in a world with well developed derivative markets, the legitimacy 
of this argument must be questioned. There is an abundance of ways to hedge against 
currency risk and a common currency might only make a very small difference after all. 
Furthermore, it is plausible that trade would increase between countries with a fixed exchange 
rate. Different types of pegged currencies reduce transaction costs. El Salvador maintained a 
peg many years prior to dollarization which might have had an effect on trade. Dollarization 
per se might not make any difference in a situation like this.  
Another important aspect is simultaneity, i.e., the distinction between the cause and the 
effect. Countries with extensive trade with the US are probably more prone to adopt the US 
dollar as legal tender. In the year prior to dollarization the export to the US as share of total 
export amounted to 65% for El Salvador and 37% for Ecuador and the import to 50% and 
32% respectively
6
. Well established trade patterns might be a contributor to dollarization 
rather than a consequence of it. Simultaneity is related to another important point raised by 
Klein (2005), namely that the effect of dollarization on trade might depend on the distance 
between the dollarizer and the host country. It is plausible that countries in Latin America 
trade with the US to a large extent regardless of the currency. Including dollarized countries 
in other parts of the world might give other results. A way to find out whether the magnitude 
of the point estimate for the dollarization dummy depends on distance would be to include an 
interaction term between the logarithm of distance and the dollarization dummy. This 
however leads us back to the problem with the insufficiency of data. Klein’s results indicate 
that dollarization might have a larger effect on trade with the US for countries that are distant 
from the US. However, the only country outside Latin America included in his data set is 
Liberia. Not many general conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of one single 
country.  
It is furthermore difficult to draw applicable conclusions for all countries from our results. 
The US is distinctly different from the dollarized countries regarding size, population and 
GDP. The gravity model requires the variables to take absolute values. Hence, a large 
percentage change in a small country might have a limited impact on the outcome. Similarly, 
a small percentage change in the US might have an unproportionately large effect on the 
outcome. 
                                                        
6
 Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS. 
30 
 
Another difficulty is the bias that might arise from self-selection. As seen in Table 2 there 
are differences in mean values between dollarized and non-dollarized observations. There is a 
risk of endogeneity if the dollarized countries share a characteristic which is not controlled for 
and if this characteristic is correlated with an independent variable. One possible way to solve 
or at least mitigate the problem with this omitted variable bias is to control for more variables 
and to do this, a larger data sample than ours is required. However, there is no guarantee that 
the problem disappears in an enlarged data set. The original data set used by Rose and his 
coauthors (see for instance Glick and Rose (2002)) and his critics like Klein (2005) contains 
hundreds of thousands of observations and still shows differences between countries with a 
national currency and countries in a currency union. Persson (2001) scrutinizes these 
differences and argues that they are likely to cause biased estimates. Advanced methods have 
been developed to deal with the self-selection problem, see for example Persson (2001) or Lin 
and Ye (2010) . 
The OLS estimator is the norm when modeling bilateral trade with a gravity model. A 
crucial assumption for unbiasedness of the OLS estimator is that the error term is uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables. In our case, trade is probably affected by unobserved factors, 
for instance fluctuations in exchange rates (prior to dollarization) or political environment. 
One way to avoid this bias is to use the fixed effects estimator instead of the OLS which 
allows unobserved, time-constant factors to be correlated with the explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Both Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and Glick and Rose (2002) estimate 
the effect of dollarization on trade using both OLS and fixed effects. The fixed effects method 
results in smaller point estimates than OLS. The fixed effects estimator is most reliable since 
it is “least demanding in terms of heroic econometric assumptions” (Glick & Rose, 2002 p. 
1135). Our coefficient for the dollarization dummy, -.094, is estimated with OLS and might 
be biased upwards due to the same omitted variable bias as in Rose’s papers. The true values 
would even less support increases in trade due to dollarization. On the other hand, our 
estimates along with those of Klein and Rose might all be underestimated due to the use of a 
static model. Neither Rose nor Klein discusses the design of their models even though trade is 
likely to be a dynamic variable. The lagged effects might need to be taken into account to 
obtain unbiased estimators.   
The bottom line is that our findings do not support the theory that dollarization increases 
trade within the dollar bloc. Rose and his coauthors investigate currency unions in general 
whereas our findings along with Klein's concern dollarization in particular. Even though we 
use the same method as Rose we obtain completely different results. This indicates that there 
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are inherent differences between dollarized countries and countries in a currency union in 
general. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply results regarding currency unions in 
general to countries considering dollarization. More research is needed on dollarized countries 
in specific to support countries considering dollarization in their decision.   
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5 Conclusions and Outlook 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to study if and how the realization of official dollarization has 
affected a number of fundamental macroeconomic variables: inflation, interest rate, GDP 
growth, business cycle correlation and trade. Focus lay on Ecuador and El Salvador which 
adopted the US dollar in 2000 and 2001 respectively. We used a comparison of means test 
and found significant decreases in the average rate of inflation and interest rate for both 
countries. This is in line with theory and our hypotheses. Regarding the effect on GDP growth 
the theory is ambiguous, and so were our results. The GDP growth rate increased in Ecuador 
after dollarization and decreased in El Salvador. 
We tested for changes in volatility in each variable. Inflation volatility and domestic 
lending rate volatility decreased in both countries. The US dollar rate in El Salvador 
decreased in average but not in volatility. GDP volatility increased significantly in Ecuador 
but not in El Salvador. In line with theory, the correlation in business cycles with the US 
increased for both Ecuador and El Salvador. Additionally, in order to study the impact of 
dollarization on trade we used a gravity regression model. The results offer no clear signs of a 
trade enhancing effect of dollarization.  
The main conclusion from our research is that dollarization is an utmost effective measure 
for lowering inflation. Its positive impact on interest rates is also well-recognized. These 
effects have been observed in several countries and empirical studies have shown unequivocal 
results. Regarding the effect of dollarization on GDP growth rate, economists have found 
ambiguous results since country specific properties dominate the effect of dollarization.  
Dollarization per se does not lead to a higher growth rate but is likely to have an indirect 
effect through lower inflation and interest rates.  
The main part of the existing research on exchange rate systems regards currency unions in 
general. Policy recommendations to countries considering the adoption of another country’s 
currency as legal tender must be based on experiences from dollarized countries in particular. 
Hence, more research is required on dollarized countries. This thesis focused on a small 
number of countries in Latin America which have adopted the US dollar. Extensive research 
could preferably include a larger variety of countries and currencies in other parts of the 
world. Additionally, it could examine changes in investments due to dollarization. For 
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instance, the El Salvadoran government wished to attract more investments by adopting the 
US dollar. Due to time constraints and especially lack of appropriate data our thesis left this 
dimension unexplored. Lastly, it would be interesting to study if any dollarized country is 
considering abandoning the US dollar in favor of another currency due to the economic 
difficulties experienced in the US since the start of the recent financial crisis. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definition 
 
Consumer Prices Ecuador defined by IMF. Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
Weights Reference Period: 2004; Geographical Coverage: covering eight cities with a 
population of more than 20,000; Number of Items in the Basket: 299 items; Basis for 
Calculation: Survey of Incomes and Expenses of Urban Homes, conducted during the period 
from February 2003 to January 2004. 
 
Consumer Prices El Salvador defined by IMF. Source: Central Reserve Bank of El 
Salvador. 
Weights Reference Period: August 2005- September 2006; Geographical Coverage: Six 
departments of the country (Sonsonate, Santa Ana, La Libertad, San Salvador, La Paz y San 
Miguel); Number of Items in Basket: 238; Basis for Calculation: The weights are derived 
from the ENIGH, which covers the period from August to September 2006. 
 
Domestic Lending Rate Ecuador defined by IMF 
Weighted average rate charged by private banks on 92- to 172-day loans in national currency. 
Beginning in January 1999, weighted average rate charged by private banks on 92- to 172-day 
loans in U.S. dollars. Nominal interest rates published from January 1999 to July 2007 were 
recalculated and expressed as annual effective rates. Beginning in September 2007, weighted 
average of the annual effective rates charged by all other depository corporations on 121- to 
180-day loans in U.S. dollars.  
 
Domestic Lending Rate El Salvador defined by Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
Loans one year or less  
 
US dollar Lending Rate El Salvador defined by Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
Loans one year or less 
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Appendix B. Statistical Tables 
 
Z- table 
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F- table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
